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Comment
Testing Drugs and Testing Limits: Merck KGaA v. Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd. and the Scope of the Hatch-Waxman
Safe Harbor Provision
Jonathan A. Hareid*
I. INTRODUCTION
The limits of the law are often ill-defined or uncertain.
Nevertheless, it is a familiar rule to impose liability for
exceeding those limits, as Oliver Wendell Holmes remarked as
a Supreme Court Justice.1 Holmes made this point about
criminal law and probably would have been surprised to learn
that in the future it would be relevant to drug research and
development activities. Yet in the wake of the Supreme Court’s
decision interpreting the scope of the Hatch-Waxman safe
harbor provision in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,2
Justice Holmes’s observation has continuing vitality.
The Hatch-Waxman safe harbor provision creates a limited
exemption from patent infringement liability for using
patented inventions to develop and submit information under
federal laws that regulate drugs.3 Integra involved Merck
KGaA (Merck), an international pharmaceutical company,
sponsoring research using certain peptides in various
Integra
experiments to identify new drug candidates.4
Lifesciences I, Ltd. (Integra) sued Merck in federal district
court, alleging that the use of the peptides infringed Integra’s
©

2006 Jonathan A. Hareid.
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1. See United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399 (1930).
2. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. (Integra II), 125 S. Ct.
2372 (2005).
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
4. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2377-79.
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patents.5 A jury found patent infringement and awarded
damages.6 On appeal, the Federal Circuit determined that the
safe harbor did not protect Merck from liability because it did
not apply to the type of activities at issue.7 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment,
holding that the Federal Circuit had adopted an improperly
narrow interpretation of the safe harbor provision.8
The safe harbor has perplexed courts and commentators
because its broad language does not mesh well with the more
limited scope suggested by its legislative history and purpose.
While many believe the safe harbor was only intended to
permit generic drug testing,9 courts have relied on the broad
statutory language to give the safe harbor a broader scope.10
The Supreme Court’s Integra decision continues the judicial
trend of broadening the safe harbor by rendering it applicable
to a wide array of new drug development activities. The impact
of Integra is evident in recent patent infringement cases
dismissed in whole or in part based on the Court’s
interpretation of the safe harbor.11 But while the safe harbor is
broad post-Integra, it nevertheless has limits. These limits
remain somewhat vague after the decision and will most
certainly be the subject of future debate and litigation.
The case is an excellent anchor for examination and
analysis of the safe harbor and the drug research process it
governs.
Part II of this Comment provides background
information on the science of drug research and development,
the regulatory approval process, the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments that include the safe harbor provision, and the
interpretation courts have given the safe harbor. Part III
describes the Integra case in detail. Part IV then analyzes the
rationale and holding of Integra to show how the case affects
5. See id. at 2379.
6. See id. at 2380.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 2384.
9. See, e.g., Douglas C. Gardner, Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck
KGaA: Upholding Fundamental Principles of Patent Law, 44 JURIMETRICS J.
523 (2004).
10. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990)
(determining safe harbor includes medical device testing).
11. See, e.g., Benitec Austl. Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., No. Civ.A. 04-0174
JJF, 2005 WL 2415959 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2005); Classen Immunotherapies,
Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 381 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D. Md. 2005).
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interpretation of the safe harbor provision, including
consideration of the limits implied by the Court‘s opinion as
applied to modern drug research. Finally, Part V concludes by
noting the challenge for Congress, the courts, and industries
involved in drug research to ensure that implementation of this
unique provision of law remains within reason given the
different policy considerations it implicates.
II. THE COMPLEX SUBJECT MATTER OF INTEGRA
The conflict in Integra emerged from the modern drug
research and development process and the complex legal
regime in which that process occurs. This section provides
background information on drug discovery, the FDA approval
process, the patent regime, and the Hatch-Waxman Act
including the safe harbor provision, and judicial interpretation
of the safe harbor.
A. THE MODERN DRUG DISCOVERY PROCESS
Contemporary drug research is the culmination of
scientific and technological progress in several fields.12 The
science of pharmacology came into being as advances in
chemistry and biology enabled understanding of the
mechanisms by which drugs exert their effects on living
systems.13 This understanding led to the generation of novel
drugs based on knowledge of the biological targets on which
drugs act.14 The rise of molecular biology and the completion of
the human genome have yielded knowledge about the biological
basis for disease that should increase both the quantity and
quality of drug targets and potentially lead to individualized
drug therapies.15
Modern drug research benefits from biotechnology, a broad
term for the practical use of biological materials such as genes,
proteins, cells, tissues, and whole organisms.16 The products of
biotechnology include research tools such as genes or gene
12. See Jürgen Drews, Drug Discovery: A Historical Perspective, 287
SCIENCE 1960 (2000).
13. See id. at 1961.
14. See id. at 1961-62.
15. See, e.g., id.; David Golan, Building Better Medicines, NEWSWEEK,
Summer 2005, at 37.
16. See Susanna Wu-Pong, An Overview of Biotechnology, in
BIOPHARMACEUTICAL DRUG DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT 1 (Susanna Wu-Pong
& Yongyut Rojanasakul eds., 1999).
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fragments, cell lines, clones and cloning tools, and laboratory
equipment and methods, as well as therapeutic products
including gene therapy, diagnostic tests, vaccines, and drugs
such as insulin.17 Some fruits of biotechnology potentially
straddle these categories and could be used either
therapeutically in humans or as tools for further research and
development.18 The biotech industry could be described as the
discovery arm of the pharmaceutical industry, providing
discoveries “upstream” that help drug companies develop
“downstream” products such as drugs.19
There are two basic approaches to discovering drugs. One
approach, which may be called screening, is more or less
random and involves simply testing various molecules in hopes
of finding one with a desired biological effect.20 The new
paradigm of drug discovery, high-throughput screening,
consists of testing large numbers of compounds in specific
biological assays to identify compounds with activity.21 The
other approach is to use rational methods to predict molecules
with biological activity. It is sometimes possible to design
drugs based on knowledge of the structure of a potential drug
target.22 Alternatively, if active compounds for a particular
drug target are already known, these compounds can be used to
design new drugs with similar activity or modify and improve
active compounds identified by screening.23 Hence, drugs can
17. See Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing,
Research Tools, and the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology
Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141, 149-50 (2004).
18. See Jian Xiao, Carving out a Biotechnology Research Tool Exception to
the Safe Harbor Provision of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
23, 48 (2003).
19. See Wu-Pong, supra note 16, at 13; Drews, supra note 12, at 1960,
1963; PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY
PROFILE
2005,
at
v-vi
(2005),
http://www.phrma.org/files/2005IndustryReport.pdf.
20. See TERRY KENAKIN, MOLECULAR PHARMACOLOGY: A SHORT COURSE
17-18 (1997).
21. See RUTH R. LEVINE, PHARMACOLOGY: DRUG ACTIONS AND REACTIONS
431 (6th ed. 2000); Drews, supra note 12, at 1962.
22. See Amy C. Anderson, The Process of Structure-Based Drug Design, 10
CHEMISTRY & BIOLOGY 787 (2003); William L. Jorgensen, The Many Roles of
Computation in Drug Discovery, 303 SCIENCE 1813 (2004).
23. See Elliot M. Ross & Terry P. Kenakin, Pharmacodynamics:
Mechanisms of Drug Action and the Relationship Between Drug Concentration
and Effect, in GOODMAN & GILMAN’S THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF
THERAPEUTICS 31, 32 (Joel G. Hardman & Lee E. Limbird eds., 10th ed. 2001).
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be used to develop other drugs.24
Both approaches to drug discovery require a multi-step
process. The first step in drug discovery is drug target
selection, which consists of target identification, target
assessment, and target validation.25 This step ensures that
drug development efforts are directed at targets that meet
criteria to maximize the probability of finding effective drugs.26
After a drug target is validated, the process moves to the lead
discovery and lead optimization phases.27 Lead discovery
consists of finding molecules active at the target.28 Once
compounds are identified, lead optimization involves subjecting
the compounds to synthetic modification to optimize activity,
selectivity, and bioavailability for the molecular target.29 Lead
optimization ensures that the best compound is chosen for drug
trials.30 The bottom line is that developing new drugs involves
significant experimentation and trial-and-error even before
extensive testing is begun in animals and humans.
B. DRUG TESTING AND THE FDA APPROVAL PROCESS
The FDA regulates drugs, medical devices, and biologics.
The FDA’s authority to regulate medical products is based on
various laws passed over the years, often in response to wellpublicized disasters involving medical products, perceived
inadequacies with the existing regulatory regime, or
technological innovation.31 The resulting regulatory structure
is complex and specifically tailored to the unique attributes of
drugs, devices, and biologics.32
24. See id. at 31 (explaining that an understanding of drug action
“provides the basis for . . . the design of new and superior therapeutic agents”).
25. See Ursula Egner et al., The Target Discovery Process, 6
CHEMBIOCHEM 468, 468 (2005).
26. See id. at 478.
27. See id. at 471.
28. See KENAKIN, supra note 20, at 17.
29. See Terry Kenakin, Predicting Therapeutic Value in the Lead
Optimization Phase of Drug Discovery, 2 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY
429, 429 (2003).
30. See id.
31. See generally Susan Bartlett Foote & Robert J. Berlin, Can Regulation
Be as Innovative as Science and Technology? The FDA’s Regulation of
Combination Products, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 619 (2005); Richard A.
Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82
VA. L. REV. 1753 (1996).
32. See Foote & Berlin, supra note 31, at 619.
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The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)33
requires the FDA to approve a new drug before it is released
into interstate commerce.34 First, a drug manufacturer must
apply for authorization to conduct clinical trials by submitting
an Investigational New Drug Application (IND) that includes
the results of preclinical tests that justify clinical testing in
humans.35 Preclinical testing data must include extensive
pharmacology and toxicology information based on in vitro and
animal studies.36 After clinical testing has begun, a drug
manufacturer must submit a New Drug Application (NDA) to
get approval to market the new drug.37 The NDA must include
the results of clinical studies that show the drug is both safe
and effective for use,38 as well as preclinical and clinical studies
that demonstrate the drug’s efficacy, toxicity, and
pharmacological properties.39
Hence, obtaining FDA approval to market a new drug
requires two phases of testing, a preclinical phase and a clinical
phase. Pursuant to FDA regulations, clinical testing generally
is further divided into three phases.40 Phase I studies involve
about twenty to eighty human subjects and aim to gain
information on a drug’s pharmacological effects, metabolism,
side effects, and pharmacokinetics.41 Phase II studies involve
several hundred research participants who may benefit from
the drug and evaluate the drug’s effectiveness and short-term
toxicity and side effects.42 Phase III trials involve several
hundred to several thousand individuals and include additional
controlled and non-controlled studies to evaluate the safety and
33. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000).
34. See id. § 355(a).
35. See id. § 355(i)(1)(A); 21 C.F.R. § 312.20(a) (2005).
36. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(8) (2005). The pharmacological data should
include information on the drug’s effects, mechanism of action, and absorption,
distribution, metabolism, and excretion, if known. Id. § 312.23(a)(8)(i). The
toxicological data may include information on acute, subacute, and chronic
toxicity, the drug’s effect on reproduction or the developing fetus, in vitro
toxicity tests, and any special toxicity resulting from mode of administration
or conditions of use. See id. § 312.23(a)(8)(ii)(a).
37. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2005).
38. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(a).
39. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50(d)(2), (5) (requiring preclinical and clinical
studies).
40. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2005).
41. See id. § 312.21(a)(1).
42. See id. § 312.21(b).
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effectiveness of the drug. These studies also determine the
benefit-risk relationship and appropriate information for
labeling.43
The drug research and development process is long and
expensive. The total time involved in discovering a new drug
and getting it approved runs between three and twenty years,
with an average of about 8.5 years.44 The total cost of getting a
new drug to market has been estimated to be as high as $897
million in year 2000 U.S. dollars.45
C. THE HATCH-WAXMAN AMENDMENTS TO THE PATENT STATUTE
AND FDCA
The Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
Congress has
respective Writings and Discoveries.”46
implemented this power by creating the patent system.47 A
patent enables an inventor to prevent others from making,
using, selling, or importing the invention in the United
States.48 This exclusive right lasts for twenty years from the
date of filing of the patent application.49 The patent system’s
purpose is to encourage investment in innovation by allowing
patent holders to capture some of the economic benefit from
their inventions.50 Patent protection is thought to encourage
the development of new drugs. A study of new drug approvals
in different countries has shown that countries with significant
patent protection had a larger number of new drugs approved
and more pharmaceutical research and development activity
than countries with less patent protection.51
While the patent system is thought to encourage
43. See id. § 312.21(c).
44. See Michael Dickson & Jean Paul Gagnon, Key Factors in the Rising
Cost of New Drug Discovery and Development, 3 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG
DISCOVERY 417, 418 fig.1 (2004).
The Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) maintains that the total time averages
14.2 years in recent decades. See id.
45. See id. at 423-26.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
47. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000).
48. See id. § 154(a)(1).
49. See id. § 154(a)(2).
50. See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 1 (3d ed.
2004).
51. See Dickson & Gagnon, supra note 44, at 421.
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innovation, it does not generally permit the unauthorized use of
a patented invention in research to modify, improve upon,
design around, or provide a substitute for the invention,
although scholars have argued for such an experimental use
exemption for some time.52 While there is a judicially-created
experimental use exemption, courts have been unwilling to
expand it beyond a very narrow scope. The common law
experimental use exemption only applies to uses “for
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical
inquiry” and does not cover acts in furtherance of legitimate
business, even if the infringer is a non-profit institution such as
a university.53
The time involved in getting a new drug developed and
approved poses a special problem for patent protection of new
drugs. Usually a new drug is not approved by the FDA until
long after the patent has issued.54 The drug manufacturer
cannot begin to market the drug without FDA approval, so the
long FDA approval process effectively shortens the length of
market exclusivity for new drugs.55
The intersection of the FDCA with the patent system also
created problems for drug manufacturers wanting to market a
generic version of a drug once the patent expired. First, before
1984, drug manufacturers had to go through the same lengthy
FDA approval process to market a generic version of an already
This seemed like wasteful duplication.
approved drug.56
Second, a drug manufacturer could not begin testing a patented
drug until the patent expired.57 While drug companies may
52. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989); see
also Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000) (arguing for a patent doctrine analogous to fair
use in copyright law which would include, but not be limited to, experimental
use of an invention).
53. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(quoting Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2000)).
54. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 17 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2650.
55. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 30 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2714.
56. See id. at 30, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2688; H.R. REP. NO.
98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat. 1585)
2647, 2649.
57. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 5 (1984), reprinted in 1984

HAREID_FINAL_UPDATED

2006]

6/7/2006 6:36:29 PM

TESTING DRUGS AND TESTING LIMITS

721

have believed such testing was protected by the common law
experimental use exemption, this notion was squarely rejected
in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.58 The
result was in effect an extension of the patent term because it
would be years after the patent expired before a generic version
would be approved for marketing. Thus, the market exclusivity
for a patented drug was distorted both at the front end of the
patent term because of required FDA approval, and at the back
end because of the prohibition on testing during the patent
period.59
Congress acted to remedy these problems by passing the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.60 The law
changed the Patent Act and FDCA in three important respects.
First, it enabled a drug manufacturer to file an Abbreviated
New Drug Application (ANDA).61 The ANDA enables a drug
manufacturer to piggyback on the safety and effectiveness data
submitted for a previously approved drug, simplifying the
approval process of generic drugs.62 Second, the law permitted
patent term extension for products subject to a regulatory
approval process before marketing, including human drugs,
animal drugs, medical devices, and food and color additives.63
This provision enables the manufacturer to recoup part of the
patent term that is lost during product testing and regulatory
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2689.
58. 733 F.2d 858, 864-65 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that the common law
experimental use exemption to patent infringement did not cover testing of a
patented drug for purposes of seeking FDA approval), superseded by statute,
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000), 35
U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2000)).
59. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669-71 (1990).
60. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 355 (2000), 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2000)). For a history leading
up to the law’s passage, see Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the HatchWaxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 187 (1999).
61. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
62. Generally, the ANDA must show that the indications for the new drug
have been approved for the previously approved drug, that the active
ingredient or ingredients are the same as for the approved drug, that the route
of administration, dosage form, and strength are the same as the active drug,
that the new drug is bioequivalent to the approved drug, and that the
proposed labeling for the new drug is the same as the labeling approved for
the approved drug. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i)-(v).
63. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(a), (f).
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review.64 Finally, the law included a provision, commonly
referred to as the safe harbor provision, which permits some
otherwise-infringing uses of patented inventions in producing
information required for FDA approval of a product, and which
in current form reads as follows:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell
within the United States or import into the United States a patented
invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological
products.65

The legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act contains
several references to the safe harbor provision, and the
committee reports suggest that the primary purpose is to
facilitate approval of generic drugs.66 The safe harbor does so
by permitting a drug company to experiment with a patented
drug for the purpose of seeking FDA approval.67 Moreover,
even when no application for approval is submitted, the
experimenter is protected so long as the experiments are done
64. The patent can be extended for half of the time spent in clinical
testing and all of the time spent while the FDA reviews the product
application. See id. § 156(c)(2), (g)(1)(B).
65. Id. § 271(e)(1).
66. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 15 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648 (stating that safe harbor provision provides that it is
not an act of patent infringement for a generic drug maker to use a patented
drug in preparation for seeking FDA approval); H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at
5 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2689 (indicating that a generic
manufacturer may obtain a supply of a patented drug and conduct tests for
purposes of FDA approval); id. at 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2692
(stating that bill permitted only limited testing “so that generic manufacturers
can establish the bioequivalency of a generic substitute”); id. at 29, reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2713 (anticipating benefits to consumers from earlier
availability of generic substitutes); id. at 30, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2714 (stating that generic manufacturer may not market a patented drug
during the life of the patent, but only test the drug for purposes of submitting
data to the FDA).
67. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2678 (“The purpose . . . is to establish that
experimentation with a patented drug product, when the purpose is to prepare
for commercial activity which will begin after a valid patent expires, is not a
patent infringement.”); H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 27 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2711 (stating that provision will reverse the holding
of Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals Co.); id. at 30, reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2714 (stating that safe harbor provision is necessitated
by the significant regulatory period for drugs to prevent artificial extension of
patents); id. (suggesting provision would be analogous to fair use doctrine in
copyright law).
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to determine whether an application will be submitted.68
Congress seemed to recognize that most patents falling under
the safe harbor provision covered drugs or other FDA-regulated
products.69 It is evident that Congress did not intend to
significantly reduce the commercial value of any patent
affected by the safe harbor provision.70
D. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISION
The safe harbor provision has been widely interpreted by
federal courts.
Numerous commentators have discussed
judicial interpretation of the safe harbor provision in detail.71
The two main interpretive problems are the types of patents
covered and the scope of activities permitted by the safe harbor
provision.
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,72 is a seminal U.S.
Supreme Court case concerning the types of patented
inventions within the safe harbor’s meaning. In this case,
Medtronic, Inc. was testing and marketing a heart defibrillator
of its competitor, Eli Lilly & Co. Medtronic argued that this
testing and marketing fell under the safe harbor provision as
the activity was “reasonably related to the development and
submission of information” under the FDCA.”73 In reaching its
decision, the Court interpreted the phrase “patented invention”
to include “all inventions, not drug-related inventions alone.”74
Moreover, the Court construed the phrase “under a Federal law
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs” to refer
to an entire statute, not just an isolated statutory provision.75
Declining to limit the safe harbor’s scope based on the
legislative history, the Court reasoned that “[i]t is not the law
68. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2678.
69. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 61 n.20 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2721 n.20 (“It is important to note that most patent
holders affected . . . will also receive a benefit from the bill in the form of
patent term extension.”).
70. See id. at 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2692 (“The patent
holder retains the right to exclude others from the major commercial
marketplace during the life of the patent. Thus, the nature of the interference
with the rights of the patent holder is not substantial.”).
71. See, e.g., Phillip B.C. Jones, Navigating the Hatch-Waxman Act’s Safe
Harbor, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 475 (2002); Xiao, supra note 18.
72. 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
73. See id. at 664.
74. Id. at 665.
75. See id. at 665-69.
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that a statute can have no effects which are not explicitly
mentioned in its legislative history.”76 Instead, the Court
reasoned from the structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act that the
safe harbor provision was part of a package that included the
patent extension provision. Accordingly, since the extension
provision explicitly included medical devices, food additives,
and color additives, as well as drugs, all of these products were
also included in the safe harbor provision.77 The Court stated
that the Act’s apparent purpose was to eliminate distortions to
patent terms for FDA-regulated products caused by the
prohibitions on marketing the products during the regulatory
review period and testing the products during the patent
term.78 On this basis, the Court reasoned that excluding
medical devices from the safe harbor would thwart this purpose
because the devices were eligible for patent term extensions.79
The Court noted, however, that some products may be eligible
for patent term extension but not fall within the safe harbor,
and vice versa.80
In the wake of Eli Lilly, courts have generally broadly
interpreted the scope of patented inventions falling under the
safe harbor. For example, in Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp.,81 the
Federal Circuit held that medical devices not eligible for patent
term extension nevertheless fell under the safe harbor
The court contended that under Eli Lilly,
provision.82
symmetry in scope between the patent extension and safe
harbor provisions was preferred but not required, and that the
inventions at issue fell under the plain language of the safe
harbor provision.83
By contrast, in Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Technology,
Inc.,84 the patents at issue covered a process for activating
bovine egg cells and a culture media for growing the cells, both
of which could be used to create transgenic cattle.85 Such cattle
76. Id. at 669 n.2 (quoting Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105,
115 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. See id. at 669-74.
78. See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 669-71.
79. Id. at 672.
80. Id. at 671-72.
81. 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
82. Id. at 1029.
83. See id.
84. 65 F. Supp. 2d 967 (W.D. Wis. 1999).
85. Id. at 969-70.
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potentially could produce milk containing the transgene
product, which would be subject to FDA approval.86 The
Infigen court held that use of these patents did not fall within
the safe harbor because neither patent was subject to the
patent term extension provision.87 This holding is in direct
conflict with Abtox because the Infigen court held that
symmetry in scope between patent term extension and the safe
harbor provisions is required.
An important case construing the uses of patented
inventions permitted by the safe harbor is Intermedics, Inc. v.
Ventritex, Inc.88 The patent at issue covered a medical device
that Ventritex was using to generate data for an FDA
application, and Intermedics argued that the safe harbor did
not apply because Ventritex intended to commercialize the
device.89 The Northern District of California held that the
scope of permissible activity concerns the actual use of the
patented invention, not the purpose of the alleged infringer.90
The court then articulated a test for determining permissible
use that has since been widely used by courts:
[W]ould it have been reasonable, objectively, for a party in
defendant’s situation to believe that there was a decent prospect that
the “use” in question would contribute (relatively directly) to the
generation of kinds of information that was likely to be relevant in
the processes by which the FDA would decide whether to approve the
product?91

Following the Intermedics decision, courts have held that
the safe harbor provision permits a variety of uses of patented
inventions. For example, display of a patented medical device
at conferences was within the safe harbor because the display
was necessary to recruit investigators to conduct clinical
trials.92 Use of a patented protein by a competitor as a
reference standard to evaluate an alternative manufacturing
method was also within the safe harbor because the FDA
presumably would have to approve the alternative
manufacturing method.93 In addition, conducting an in vivo
86. See id. at 974.
87. See id. at 980.
88. 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff’d, 991 F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
89. See id. at 1273.
90. See id. at 1275.
91. Id. at 1280.
92. See Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520,
1522-23 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
93. See Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104,
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purity test of that protein fell within the safe harbor because
the test was necessary to confirm the purity of the product for
use in clinical trials that would be submitted to the FDA.94
Simply producing a commercial-size quantity of a patented
product has also been held to be within the safe harbor because
of the need to demonstrate suitable manufacturing capability
for FDA approval.95 By contrast, stockpiling a large batch of a
drug in evident preparation to sell immediately following FDA
approval was outside the scope of the safe harbor.96
Another notable case is Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. RhônePoulenc Rorer, Inc.,97 which is significant because it involved
new drug development activities and portended some of the
issues in Integra. Rhône-Poulenc Rorer held patents on
compounds that were intermediates in the synthesis of the
Bristol-Myers Squibb used these
drug paclitaxel.98
intermediates in basic research to develop a structure-activity
relationship database which in turn was used to screen more
than 1000 compounds for biological activity, and also in studies
to create analogs of paclitaxel by chemical modification.99
Citing the Intermedics test, the District Court of Massachusetts
found these research activities to fall within the safe harbor.100
The court rejected the patent holder’s argument that the safe
harbor should not apply until a particular drug candidate is
selected for further study or filed with the FDA, responding
that this would prevent competitors from being able to
experiment with a patented drug to create new and improved
drugs.101 The court reasoned that if the safe harbor only
applied after a particular drug candidate was selected or filed
with the FDA, the safe harbor would never be reached because
the underlying research and development required to reach
that stage could not be conducted.102 The court held that the
109 (D. Mass. 1998).
94. See id. at 109-10.
95. See NeoRx Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202, 206 (D.N.J.
1994).
96. See Biogen, Inc. v. Schering AG, 954 F. Supp. 391, 396-97 (D. Mass.
1996).
97. No. 95 Civ. 8833(RPP), 2001 WL 1512597 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001).
98. Id. at *1.
99. See id. at *4-5.
100. See id. at *6.
101. See id.
102. See id.
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safe harbor applies to preliminary research that may not
directly yield information that would be submitted to the FDA,
as long as the research facilitates or would be useful in
generating information that could be submitted.103
It is evident from these cases that the courts have given
the safe harbor a wide berth. The safe harbor has been held to
protect the use of a variety of patented products, and the range
of activities permitted is similarly broad. While there is
precedent for the proposition that the scope of the safe harbor
is not unlimited, it is not readily apparent where the outer
limits lie.
III. TESTING THE LIMITS OF THE SAFE HARBOR:
INTEGRA
The Supreme Court recently visited the issue of the limits
of the safe harbor in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I,
Ltd.104 The case involved the international drug manufacturer
Merck KGaA (Merck), which was sponsoring various
experiments aimed at developing new drugs using certain
peptides. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. (Integra), a competitor of
Merck, claimed these peptides were covered by its patents.105
The facts of the case and the opinions of the Federal Circuit
and the Supreme Court highlight the issues and concerns
associated with different interpretations of the safe harbor.
A. FACTS AND BACKGROUND
Integra holds five patents related to a short tri-peptide
sequence known as the RGD peptide.106 The RGD peptide
promotes cell adhesion to substrates in vivo and in vitro by
interacting with a particular class of receptors on cell surface
proteins called integrins.107 Dr. David Cheresh, a scientist at
the Scripps Institute (Scripps), discovered that blocking these
receptors inhibits angiogenesis, a process involved in various
pathologies.108
Merck agreed to collaborate with Scripps to test
angiogenesis inhibitors as drug candidates and ultimately
103. Bristol-Meyers, 2001 WL 1512597 at *7.
104. 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
105. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2377-79.
106. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., v. Merck KGaA (Integra I), 331 F.3d
860, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
107. See id.
108. See id. at 863.
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submit an IND to the FDA.109 Pursuant to the agreement, Dr.
Cheresh conducted research using various RGD peptides
supplied by Merck.110 The research consisted of in vitro and in
vivo experiments on the RGD peptides to determine their
efficacy, specificity, toxicity, mechanism of action, and
pharmacokinetics to find suitable candidates to develop as
Scripps also conducted
drugs to inhibit angiogenesis.111
research to find other compounds that would have a similar
effect as the RGD peptides. For these experiments, the RGD
peptides were used as positive controls against which to
measure the efficacy of the compounds studied.112 Merck
eventually took steps to guide one of the RGD peptides through
the FDA approval process.113
While these studies were ongoing, Integra filed a patent
infringement suit in federal district court against Merck,
Scripps, and Dr. Cheresh for use of the RGD peptides.114 The
district court’s jury instruction essentially recited the
Intermedics test to determine whether the safe harbor shielded
The jury
Merck from patent infringement liability.115
instruction provided that information did not have to be
actually submitted to the FDA for the safe harbor to apply.116
The jury determined that the safe harbor was not applicable,
found patent infringement by the defendants, and awarded $15
million in damages.117 In response to post-trial motions, the
district court dismissed the claims against Scripps and Dr.
Cheresh. The district court, however, affirmed the damage
award against Merck because the trial evidence was sufficient
to show that the connection between the research activities and
FDA review was too attenuated for the safe harbor provision to
apply.118

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2378.
See id.
See id. at 2378-79.
See id. at 2379.
See id.
See id.
See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2379.
See id.
See id. at 2380.
See id.
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B. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISION
1. The Majority Opinion
Merck filed a timely appeal with the Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals asserting, among other things, error in the district
court’s interpretation of the safe harbor provision.119 The
court’s analysis began with a discussion of the safe harbor
provision’s legislative history.120 The court concluded that
based on the legislative history the provision was intended to
permit testing of generic drugs and interference with the rights
of the patent holder was intended to be minimal.121
Furthermore, the court determined the word “solely” in the
statutory text limits the extent of activities protected by the
safe harbor.122 “[R]easonably related to the development and
submission of information” also limits the scope of the provision
to activities that produce information for the FDA, although the
court conceded that this includes some activities that are not
experiments.123
The court found that the research Merck had sponsored
“was not clinical testing to supply information to the FDA, but
only general biomedical research to identify new
pharmaceutical compounds.”124 Concluding that the FDA was
not interested in “the hunt for drugs that may or may not later
undergo clinical testing” for approval and that the agency “does
not require information about drugs other than the compound”
included in an IND, the court determined that the work Merck
had sponsored “was not ‘solely for uses reasonably related’ to
clinical testing for FDA.”125
The court stated that in this context the safe harbor
“simply does not globally embrace all experimental activity that
at some point, however attenuated, may lead to an FDA
approval process.”126 Hence, the court determined that the
provision does not cover all stages of the development of new

119. See Integra I, 331 F.3d 860, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct.
2372 (2005).
120. See id. at 864-65.
121. See id. at 865.
122. See id. at 866.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. Integra I, 331 F.3d at 866.
126. Id. at 867.
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drugs.127 The court further concluded that extending the safe
harbor to all stages of new drug development would result in
more than minimal encroachment on the rights of patent
holders and potentially vitiate the value of patented research
tools, which derive their primary commercial value from use in
research.128 The court feared that an overly expansive safe
harbor “would swallow the whole benefit of the Patent Act for
some categories of biotechnological inventions.”129 For these
reasons, the court affirmed the district court’s interpretation of
the safe harbor provision.130
2. The Dissent
Judge Newman dissented from the court’s opinion.131 She
discussed the research conducted by Merck and Scripps and the
common law experimental use exemption.132 She argued that
because the research was aimed at understanding, improving
upon, or modifying the patented subject matter, the
experimental use exception applied.133 She agreed with the
majority that the safe harbor provision did not include all
stages of new drug development, but she contended that the
experimental use exception covered the research not included
in the safe harbor and that the safe harbor “took up where the
research exemption left off.”134 Regarding the court’s fear that
exemption from patent infringement liability would diminish
the value of patented research tools, she maintained that use of
a research tool is different from study of the tool itself, and thus
that the RGD peptides were not used as research tools by
Merck and Scripps.135

127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 868. The court went on to determine that the district court
correctly concluded that the RGD peptides used by Merck and Scripps fell
within the claims of Integra’s patents. See id. at 868-69. The court also
analyzed the jury’s damage award and held that it was not supported by the
evidence. See id. at 869-72. These holdings are not pertinent to the subject of
this comment and thus are not discussed further.
131. See Integra I, 331 F.3d at 872-78 (Newman, J., dissenting).
132. See id. at 873-76. She referred to the exemption as the “common law
research exemption.” Id. at 874.
133. See id. at 876.
134. See id. at 878.
135. See id.
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C. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
Federal Circuit’s construction of the safe harbor provision.136
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia quoted the
statutory language and stated the safe harbor “provides a wide
berth for the use of patented drugs in activities related to the
federal regulatory process.”137 Based on the text, the Court
held that the safe harbor applies to activities reasonably
related to the development and submission of any information
under the FDCA; thus, preclinical studies of patented
compounds were included within the safe harbor.138 The Court
noted that the statutory language does not limit the phases of
research or types of submissions included within the safe
harbor.139
Addressing Integra’s argument that only preclinical
studies pertaining to safety of drugs in humans were of interest
to the FDA, the Court pointed to the FDA’s requirement that
INDs contain information about a drug’s pharmacological,
pharmacokinetic, toxicological, and biological qualities in
animals.140 The Court maintained that such information
generally must be obtained through preclinical in vitro and in
vivo studies.141 Furthermore, the FDA requires an IND to
include information that enables the agency to make a riskbenefit assessment on whether to allow clinical trials, and
“[s]uch information necessarily includes preclinical studies of a
drug’s efficacy in achieving particular results.”142
Turning to the Federal Circuit’s rationale, the Court
rejected the notion that the safe harbor applies only to
experiments actually included in an FDA submission.143 The
Court noted that scientific testing is a trial-and-error process.
Drug companies generally do not know in advance which
experiments will be successful. Hence, they do not know in
advance which experiments will be appropriate to include in an

136. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2380 (2005).
137. Id. at 2380. The language of the safe harbor provision, codified at 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000), is quoted at note 65 and accompanying text.
138. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2380.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 2381 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(5) (2005)).
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 2382-83.
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FDA submission.144 Referring to the “reasonably related”
language in the statute, the Court posited that the relationship
of an experiment “to the ‘development and submission of
information’ to the FDA does not become more attenuated (or
less reasonable) simply because the data from that experiment
are left out of the submission that is ultimately passed along to
Rather, the safe harbor leaves room for
the FDA.”145
“experimentation and failure” in drug development and
approval.146 Moreover, the Court stated, drug companies also
face uncertainty about what research to include in an IND or
NDA to get FDA approval.147
The Court further reasoned that limiting the safe harbor to
testing on a compound actually included in an FDA submission
would effectively limit the safe harbor to generic drug approval,
because the only way researchers will know for certain that
experiments on an identical compound will be appropriate to
include in an FDA submission is if the compound is already
approved.148 Referring again to the statutory text, the Court
rejected the claim that the safe harbor is limited to generic
drug approval.149 Rather, the safe harbor protects “all uses of
patented compounds ‘reasonably related’ to the process of
developing information for submission under any federal law
regulating the manufacture, use, or distribution of drugs.”150
Addressing the Federal Circuit’s concern about depriving
patented research tools of much of their value, the Court
expressly declined to decide whether use of such tools fell under
the safe harbor, claiming that it was evident from the record
that the RGD peptides were not used as research tools.151
The Court agreed with the Federal Circuit’s assertion that
the safe harbor does not cover all activity that may lead to an
FDA approval process.152 In particular, “[b]asic scientific
144. See Integra II, 125 S.Ct. at 2382-83.
145. Id. at 2383.
146. Id.
147. See id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 312.22(b) (2005) (noting that the amount of
information that must be submitted in an IND for a particular drug depends
on several factors)).
148. See id.
149. See id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000)).
150. Integra II, 125 S.Ct. at 2383 (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,
496 U.S. 661, 674 (1990)).
151. See id. at 2382 n.7.
152. See id. at 2382.
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research on a particular compound, performed without the
intent to develop a particular drug or a reasonable belief that
the compound will cause the sort of physiological effect the
researcher intends to induce” does not satisfy the “reasonably
related” standard set by the statutory language.153 However,
the Court posited that the safe harbor applies when a
compound is chosen based on particular expectations about its
mechanism of action and effect and used in research aimed at
producing the type of information appropriate to submit to the
FDA:
[W]here a drugmaker has a reasonable basis for believing that a
patented compound may work, through a particular biological
process, to produce a particular physiological effect, and uses the
compound in research that, if successful, would be appropriate to
include in a submission to the FDA, that use is “reasonably related”
to the “development and submission of information under . . . Federal
law.”154

The Court indicated that the jury instruction given by the
district court was “consistent with, if less detailed than, the
construction . . . that we adopt today.”155 Because the Court
found that the Federal Circuit used a flawed interpretation of
the safe harbor provision when it rejected Merck’s challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury verdict, the
Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment and remanded
the case for further proceedings.156 The Federal Circuit has
since reinstated the appeal with the original panel of judges
and ordered the parties to submit new briefs that take account
of the Supreme Court opinion.157 As of the printing of this
article no decision has been reported.
IV. ANALYZING INTEGRA: THE SAFE HARBOR AND ITS
LIMITS
A. INTERPRETATION OF THE SAFE HARBOR AFTER INTEGRA
The Federal Circuit and Supreme Court opinions in
Integra reflect differing views of the Hatch-Waxman safe
harbor provision. A similar dichotomy pervades the academic
literature, with some commentators arguing that the safe
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2383 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000)).
155. Id. at 2384.
156. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2384.
157. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 421 F.3d 1289, 1289
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
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harbor should be restricted to generic drug testing or clinical
testing, and others contending that the safe harbor should
protect a broader range of activities and cover a wider variety
These distinct views arise from different
of patents.158
interpretations of statutory text, structure, and legislative
history. The dichotomy also arises in part from distinct policy
considerations evident in the Integra opinions: the Federal
Circuit approached its task with a view toward the dangers of
an overly broad safe harbor while the Supreme Court
approached the same task emphasizing the pitfalls of a narrow
safe harbor. The cogency of the arguments in both opinions
testifies to the merits of both positions: the safe harbor should
be interpreted neither too broadly nor too narrowly. While
Integra binds future courts to a broad view of the safe harbor,
these courts should recognize that the opinion describes limits
on the scope of activities permitted, and that the opinion is not
inconsistent with, and implicitly supports, limits on the types of
patented inventions that may be used within the safe harbor.
The Court invoked the statutory text for the proposition
that the safe harbor “provides a wide berth for the use of
patented drugs in activities related to the federal regulatory
process.”159 The plain language of the provision indeed sweeps
very broadly. The provision uses the term “patented invention”
rather than “patented drug” or “patented drug already
The current statutory language
approved for use.”160
specifically excludes new animal drugs or veterinary biological
products prepared by site specific genetic manipulation
techniques, suggesting that other products are not excluded
Nor does the statutory
from the safe harbor’s scope.161
language that follows impose such limits, at least not directly.
While the safe harbor restricts the use of patented inventions
to the production of information “under a Federal law which
158. Compare, e.g., Gardner, supra note 9 (arguing that the Federal Circuit
was correct to narrow the scope of the safe harbor), with Alison Ladd, Integra
v. Merck: Effects on the Cost and Innovation of New Drug Products, 13 J.L. &
POL’Y 311 (2005) (arguing in the wake of the Federal Circuit decision that a
broad safe harbor is necessary to control drug costs and encourage new drug
development and innovation).
159. Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2380.
160. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
161. See id. When Congress provides exceptions in a statute, the natural
inference is that Congress considered the issue of exceptions and limited the
statute to the exceptions set forth. See United States. v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53,
58 (2000).
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regulates . . . drugs or veterinary biological products,”162 this
seems like an unlikely way to limit the term “patented
invention.” It would have been more natural to do so by
qualifying or elaborating on the patented inventions covered.163
The uses of patented inventions permitted by the safe
harbor are governed by the phrase “solely for uses reasonably
related to the development and submission of information”
under a federal law regulating drugs or veterinary biological
products.164 The word “solely” could be construed to restrict the
scope of permissible activities as the Federal Circuit suggested,
but this reading would be in tension with the further modifier
“reasonably related,” which suggests some leeway in what is
permitted. The fact that the statute includes the word “uses”
instead of “purposes” suggests that the inquiry is an objective
one focused on the actual uses to which the invention is put,
not on the subjective purposes of the user.165 The phrase
“reasonably related to the development and submission of
information” seems to encompass activities that produce the
type of information included in FDA submissions such as INDs
and NDAs, even if the activities do not in fact produce
information that is actually included. Moreover, the term
“reasonably related” indicates that some activities that do not
directly produce such information are included. Although the
modifier “reasonably” also limits the range of these activities,
courts after Integra are bound by the Court’s refusal “to read
the ‘reasonable relation’ requirement so narrowly as to render .
. . protection of activities leading to FDA approval for all drugs
illusory.”166
In holding that the safe harbor extends to new drug
development activities, the Integra Court implicitly rejected a
limit to the safe harbor’s scope arguably implied by the
structure of the statutory scheme created by the HatchWaxman amendments. The Eli Lilly Court reasoned that the
Hatch-Waxman provisions aim to eliminate the distortions in
marketing exclusivity conferred by patent terms for products
subject to FDA approval, and hence patent term extension and
the safe harbor provisions should both generally apply to the
162. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
163. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 667-68 (1990).
164. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
165. For an excellent elaboration of this point, see Intermedics, Inc. v.
Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff’d, 991 F.2d 808 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).
166. Integra II, 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2383 (2005).
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same products.167 On this view, the safe harbor exists to
permit testing and regulatory approval of an otherwise
infringing product, such as a generic drug or similar medical
device, so that commercial marketing can begin as soon as the
patent on the pioneer product expires. This logic does not
extend to new drug development because a new drug by
definition differs from existing drugs. Because a new drug
differs from existing drugs, a new drug does not prevent
distortion in marketing exclusivity at the back end of the
patent term for these existing drugs. On the basis of the
structural argument in Eli Lilly, a court before Integra could
have concluded that the safe harbor does not extend to new
drug development activities. Indeed, the Federal Circuit’s
constrained view of permissible activities in Integra was
partially based on the proposition that the safe harbor allows
for pre-expiration testing of a patented drug already on the
market to facilitate generic approval.168
This structural argument, however, was only part of the
rationale in Eli Lilly. The Court also rested its holding on the
plain language of the safe harbor provision.169 Before Integra,
courts have differed over whether the safe harbor’s scope is to
be determined by its plain language or by its purpose as
indicated by the statutory structure. Some courts have focused
on the plain language to extend the safe harbor beyond the
scope suggested by the structural argument in Eli Lilly.170 At
least one court, however, has relied on the structural argument
to hold that the safe harbor only applies to products eligible for
patent term extension.171
The Integra Court resolved this question by resting its
holding on the statutory language, which on its face does not
limit the safe harbor to generic product testing.172 The
reasoning of Integra may make future courts less likely to read
limitations into the safe harbor based on statutory structure or
167. See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 669-74 (1990).
168. See Integra I, 331 F.3d 860, 866-67 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 S.
Ct. 2372 (2005).
169. See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 665-69.
170. See, e.g., Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1029 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (holding that the safe harbor applies to testing of medical devices not
eligible for patent term extension).
171. See Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967, 980
(W.D. Wis. 1999).
172. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2383 (2005).
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purpose, although Integra does not render these considerations
illegitimate. The Integra opinion resists taking the safe harbor
to the limit that a literal reading of the statutory language
would permit. Thus, Integra should be read as endorsing a
broader statutory purpose than generic drug testing or the
prevention of patent term distortion; it should not be read as an
outright abandonment of purpose-based interpretation in favor
of a literal statutory reading.
Legislative history also did not sway the Integra Court to
adopt a more constrained view of the safe harbor’s scope. The
Court did not cite or mention the legislative history of the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments. In contrast, the Eli Lilly Court
mentioned, without much elaboration, that the legislative
history “sheds no clear light” on interpretation of the safe
harbor.173 The reason the legislative history was not examined
more thoroughly may be that both the Eli Lilly and Integra
opinions were authored by Justice Scalia, who has argued that
judges should not rely on legislative history in statutory
interpretation.174 Several commentators have pointed to the
legislative history in arguing that Congress intended the safe
harbor to only protect testing and approval of generic versions
of patented drugs already on the market.175 In Integra, the
Federal Circuit referred to legislative history concluding that
the safe harbor should be construed narrowly.176 However,
because the Supreme Court in Integra determined that the safe
harbor encompasses new drug development activities, future
courts are constrained from using legislative history to limit
the safe harbor to generic product testing, although they may
be able to limit the safe harbor’s scope in other respects based
on legislative history.
The realities of drug testing and approval are prominent in
the Court’s interpretation of the safe harbor, and rightly so.
Based on the trial-and-error nature of the drug discovery and
development process, the Court appropriately reasoned that
the safe harbor must be wide enough to accommodate

173. See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 669.
174. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518-28 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
175. See, e.g., Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, Can the Safe Harbor of 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1) Shelter Pioneer Drug Manufacturers?, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 643
(1998); Gardner, supra note 9.
176. See Integra I, 331 F.3d 860, 865 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct.
2372 (2005).
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experimentation and failure.177 The safe harbor must also be
wide enough to cover the entire range of activities that produce
the extensive safety and effectiveness information the FDA
requires, which means more than just clinical trials.178 The
pragmatic message for future courts is that interpretation of
the safe harbor should not be divorced from the realities of the
subject matter the law governs.
The Integra Court formulated a view of the safe harbor
best described as a special experimental use exemption for
using patented drugs and potential drugs in research to be
submitted for federal approval (as opposed to a more general
experimental use exemption, which would not be limited to
approval activities for FDA-regulated products). The Court
repeatedly referred to the safe harbor as protecting the use of
patented compounds in research to produce information for an
The safe harbor applies when the
FDA application.179
researcher has a reasonable basis for believing that a
compound has a particular mechanism of action and effect and
uses that compound in research that, if successful, would be
appropriate for FDA submission.180 Hence, Integra is most
consistent with the view that the safe harbor, at its core,
protects the use of patented compounds in research to develop a
particular drug, be it a generic version of an already approved
drug or an entirely new drug. Because the safe harbor extends
177. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2382-84. While the Court did not cite
legislative history, the committee reports for the Hatch-Waxman amendments
support the Court’s view that the safe harbor is not limited to activities that
produce information actually submitted to the FDA. See H.R. REP. NO. 98857, pt. 1, at 45 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2678 (“The
information which can be developed under this provision is the type which is
required to obtain approval of the drug. A party which develops such
information, but decides not to submit an application for approval, is protected
as long as the development was done to determine whether or not an
application for approval would be sought.”).
178. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2381.
179. Id. at 2380 (stating the safe harbor “provides a wide berth for the use
of patented drugs in activities related to the federal regulatory process”); id.
(the safe harbor “necessarily includes preclinical studies of patented
compounds that are appropriate for submission to the FDA”); id. at 2382
(noting the safe harbor “is sufficiently broad to protect the use of patented
compounds” in experiments not ultimately submitted to the FDA); id. at 2383
(stating the safe harbor covers “all uses of patented compounds ‘reasonably
related’ to the process of developing information for submission under any
federal law regulating the manufacture, use, or distribution of drugs”).
180. See id. at 2383.
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to other FDA-regulated products such as medical devices,181
Integra’s holding can be generalized as protecting the use of
patented products or potential products subject to FDA review
in research to develop and approve competing products,
whether the same as or substantially similar to the original
product or substantially different from the original product.
Note that while in this view the safe harbor is not limited
to generic drug testing or the prevention of patent term
distortion, Integra stops short of taking the safe harbor to the
limit permitted by its literal language. The provision permits
the use of “a patented invention,” which does not necessarily
limit the safe harbor to the use of products subject to FDA
approval. However, by expressly declining to comment on
whether the safe harbor covers use of patented research
tools,182 the Court avoided the question of whether the safe
harbor applies to use of any patented invention. In fact,
compelling legal reasons weigh against reading the safe harbor
to cover any patented invention. Fear that an overly broad safe
harbor would cover, and potentially vitiate the value of,
biotechnology tool patents was part of the Federal Circuit’s
rationale in adopting a narrow view of the safe harbor’s
scope.183 However, the Supreme Court, based on the realities of
drug development and the requirements for FDA approval,
offered a powerful critique of the Federal Circuit’s view. The
better solution to prevent inappropriate applications of the safe
harbor is to simply read limitations on the types of patented
inventions that may be used, although the Supreme Court
failed to provide much guidance on this matter.
While the Court did not cite legislative history, it is
important to note that the legislative history is not necessarily
inconsistent with the result in Integra. The committee reports’
several references to generics do not necessarily mean that
Congress intended to limit the safe harbor to generic drug
testing.184 There is no express statement limiting the safe
harbor to generic testing in either the statutory text or the
committee reports. Moreover, much of the rationale in the
committee reports suggests that the safe harbor should also
181. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669-74 (1990)
(holding that the safe harbor includes medical device testing).
182. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2382 n.7.
183. See Integra I, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct.
2372 (2005).
184. See supra Part II.C for a survey of the legislative history of the HatchWaxman Amendments.
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apply to new drug development activities. If a limited amount
of testing using a patented compound does not significantly
affect the commercial value of the patent, it is hard to
understand why it should matter whether the testing is done to
develop a generic drug or a new drug.
One might respond that the safe harbor exists to prevent
patent term distortion, and that new drugs, unlike generic
drugs, do not prevent patent term distortion for existing drugs,
as discussed previously. However, the inclusion of new drug
development prevents the marketing exclusivity for existing
drugs from being bloated in other ways. The inability of drug
manufacturers to use patented compounds in research is
problematic not only for timely development of generic drugs,
but also for research and development of new drugs to compete
with approved drugs. A fundamental reality of drug research is
that existing drugs are important tools for discovering new
drugs.185 Hence, the inability to use patented compounds in
research impedes the discovery of new drugs as well as the
emergence of generics. This rationale applies to manufacturers
trying to make a new drug with similar properties to an
approved drug or to manufacturers wanting to use a
competitor’s lead compounds in product development, even if
those compounds have never been subject to the FDA approval
process. The ability to use a competitor’s patented compounds
in research enables the development of compounds with similar
properties that otherwise might not be developed until some
time after the relevant patent expired. The inability to conduct
such testing would give the patent holder not only market
exclusivity for a particular drug but also the ability to
potentially hinder the emergence of alternative new drugs.
The bottom line is that Congress had good reason to write
the safe harbor provision in broad terms that would include
new drug development activities. So while the rationale of
Integra may seem insistently focused on the statutory text, the
Court was correct to read the text as including new drug
development activities. This reading is consistent with the
Court’s acknowledgement of the realities of drug research and
development in the Integra opinion. And while the legislative
history and statutory structure may suggest more limited
purposes for the safe harbor, neither necessarily indicates that
new drug development is excluded. Consequently, Integra
185. See supra Part II.A.
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should not be read as rendering statutory structure, legislative
history, or purpose irrelevant to interpretation of the safe
harbor, nor should it be read as extending the safe harbor to
the far limits of the provision’s literal language. Rather, the
opinion should be read as providing for broad but not unlimited
experimental use of certain types of patented inventions for use
in developing competing products for FDA approval. As future
courts determine the exact contours of the safe harbor postIntegra, they should account both for the necessities and
realities of the modern drug development and approval process
and for the purposes and policies the safe harbor serves.
B. SCOPE AND LIMITS OF THE SAFE HARBOR AFTER INTEGRA
1. Activities Included in the Safe Harbor
In addressing the scope of activities included in the safe
harbor, the Court made certain propositions quite clear. First,
the safe harbor applies to both preclinical and clinical
studies.186 Since the FDA requires information from animal
and in vitro studies for certain submissions, uses of patented
inventions in such studies fall within the safe harbor. Second,
the fact that a particular activity is not included in an FDA
submission does not remove that activity from the
exemption.187 The safe harbor is broad enough to accommodate
this uncertainty involved in the drug research process. While
these acknowledgements should provide comfort for those
engaged in drug research and development, the exact scope of
activities protected by the safe harbor is not entirely clear.
Even as the decision stills any doubts that the safe harbor
provides a “wide berth” for research activities, the Court made
equally clear that the safe harbor does not encompass all
research aimed at developing new drugs.
The Court articulated a two-pronged test to determine
whether a particular experiment is included in the safe harbor.
The first prong requires a researcher to have “a reasonable
basis for believing that a patented compound may work,
through a particular biological process, to produce a particular
physiological effect.”188 The second prong requires that the
compound be used “in research that, if successful, would be
186. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2380 (2005).
187. See id. at 2383.
188. Id.
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appropriate to include in a submission to the FDA.”189
Evidently, both prongs must be satisfied for the safe harbor to
apply, but since the Integra Court’s premise is that the safe
harbor includes new drug development activities, courts may be
lenient in applying the prongs so that essential steps in new
drug development are covered.
Several aspects of the standard are salient. First is the
emphasis on particular expectations. The mere use of a
compound in an experiment does not trigger the safe harbor.
The research must be done with an expectation that the
compound works through a particular mechanism to produce a
particular effect. Hence, the safe harbor is keyed to hypothesisdriven research and does not protect activities undertaken with
a purely shotgun approach. That is, it does not protect
experiments done without any basis for expecting a particular
outcome.
Second, the standard requires that the activity be part of
research that has the potential to produce information
appropriate to include in an FDA submission such as an IND or
an NDA. Not all research qualifies. The Court left no doubt on
this matter: “[b]asic scientific research on a particular
compound, performed without the intent to develop a particular
drug or a reasonable belief that the compound will cause the
sort of physiological effect the researcher intends to induce”
does not satisfy the “reasonably related” standard set by the
statutory language.190
It is not clear, however, exactly what triggers the safe
harbor’s protection. It could be intent to develop a particular
type of drug, intent to take a particular compound of interest
through further research and development that will lead to the
FDA approval process, or testing and experimentation that will
produce information of the type that are appropriate to include
in an FDA submission, such as experiments to determine a
compound’s mechanism of action, toxicity, or pharmacokinetics.
Note that the second prong of the Court’s test requires the use
of the compound in “research”—not in “experiments”—to be
submitted to the FDA if successful. The term “research”
suggests a whole line of experiments, some of which may be
preliminary to the type capable of producing information the
FDA would actually consider. Given the necessity of such
189. Id.
190. Id. at 2382.
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preliminary experiments in drug development, they are likely
to be included in the safe harbor.191
Third, the test refers to using “patented compounds” in
research.
This indicates that basic research before the
identification of active compounds does not fall in the safe
harbor. It also indicates that the safe harbor, at least at its
core, covers research using patented drugs and potential drugs;
it does not provide a license to infringe any type of patent in
the advanced stages of drug research. Although the safe
harbor provision uses the term “patented invention,” it may be
inappropriate for courts to countenance the unauthorized use of
patented inventions other than potential drugs and other FDAregulated products, even though such use may fall within the
literal language of the safe harbor provision.
The process of developing a new drug and getting FDA
approval involves several stages. The Court’s test suggests
that activities in some of these stages are certainly within the
safe harbor, activities at other stages certainly fall outside, and
certain activities may fall in a gray area.
The FDA requires extensive information about a
compound’s
pharmacological
characteristics,
such
as
mechanism of action, metabolism, excretion, pharmacokinetics,
and toxicity, based on in vitro, animal, and human studies.
Once a company has settled on a particular compound and is in
the process of completing these studies, the safe harbor clearly
applies. These studies lie at the core of the second prong of the
Court’s standard, protecting research that, if successful, would
produce information appropriate to include in an FDA
submission. The first prong is also satisfied. A compound at
this stage has been selected to go through the FDA approval
process because of previously acquired knowledge of its
mechanism and effects. Thus, manufacturers can be confident
of the safe harbor’s protection at the point a selected drug
candidate undergoes preclinical and clinical testing.
On the other hand, the stages of basic research leading up
to and through drug target selection and validation seem to fall
outside the safe harbor. The Court’s formulation requires
research to have progressed to the point of testing compounds
191. See id. at 2383 (refusing “to read the ‘reasonable relation’ requirement
so narrowly as to render . . . protection of activities leading to FDA approval
for all drugs illusory”); see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhône-Poulenc
Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833(RPP), 2001 WL 1512597, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28,
2001).
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for the safe harbor to apply, so all research before the
identification of lead compounds is excluded.
The phases of lead compound identification and
optimization precede the preclinical and clinical testing phases;
therefore, this type of research may be a gray area for safe
harbor applicability. At these stages of research, a company
first identifies active compounds and subjects these compounds
to various modifications to optimize their drug-like properties.
Although compounds are involved at these stages, the Court
made clear that not all research, even using compounds, falls
within the safe harbor.192
The lead optimization stage involves trying various
chemical modifications to an active molecule to improve its
drug-like properties before clinical trials. At this point, it is
known that the molecule has a particular pharmacological
mechanism and effect, so the first prong of the Court’s test is
probably satisfied. However, data from lead optimization
studies may be inappropriate for FDA submission because, at
this stage, the researchers have not settled upon the exact
compound that will go through the approval process. Thus lead
optimization studies may not satisfy the second prong if it is
construed very strictly. Courts are unlikely to do so, however.
At this phase the researchers have found a promising lead
compound for further development and potentially for clinical
trials. Lead optimization is generally necessary before the
potential drug can go through the approval process, and finding
studies at this phase to be outside the safe harbor simply
because the particular experiments will not be included in a
submission seems to be exactly the sort of reasoning the
Integra Court rejected. Thus, courts are likely to find research
in this phase to fall within the safe harbor.
The lead identification phase precedes lead optimization
and is the phase at which a drug target has been selected and
active molecules are first identified. Experiments that simply
identify lead compounds are not appropriate for FDA
submission because the exact compound that will go through
the FDA approval process has not yet been chosen. Therefore,
like lead optimization studies, these experiments may not
satisfy the second prong of the Court’s test. However, as with
lead optimization activities, the experiments are essential
prerequisites for getting to the approval process. Moreover, at
192. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2383.

HAREID_FINAL_UPDATED

2006]

6/7/2006 6:36:29 PM

TESTING DRUGS AND TESTING LIMITS

745

this point the company has selected a drug target (a significant
investment of time and money in itself) and thus has a concept
for a drug to be developed. Integra could be read to indicate
that “intent to develop a particular drug” may be sufficient to
trigger the safe harbor.193 However, based on the Court’s test
and the opinion’s distinction between basic research and
research “reasonably related to the development and
submission of information” to the FDA,194 it seems likely that
“intent to develop a particular drug” refers to intent to take a
particular compound through development and FDA approval,
not simply intent to develop a particular type of drug.
High-throughput screening of patented compounds or
libraries of compounds are likely to fail the first prong of the
Court’s test.
With high-throughput screening, the
experimenter does not know in advance if any particular
compound will work; this is exactly what the screen
determines. Hence, use of patented compounds that are
selected for the screen for no particular reason is probably not
within the safe harbor.195 However, if a set of compounds is
chosen in advance for screening based on knowledge of their
likely biological effect or mechanism (based on structureactivity relationships, perhaps), the first prong may be
satisfied. Note that the first prong refers to having “a
reasonable basis” for believing that a compound will work, not
to certainty or high likelihood. For this reason, if a company
has a scientific rationale for selecting a particular compound
for further testing, the first prong is likely satisfied. The
Court’s test favors rational methods for identifying lead
compounds.
The screening of patented compounds should be
distinguished from the use of a known drug or lead compound
to either determine the characteristics of active compounds to
assist with screening (as in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.196) or as a
193. See id. at 2382.
194. See id.
195. At oral argument, in response to Justice Scalia’s question about
whether the screening of different compounds to find active ones was basic
research, counsel urged that the safe harbor must apply at the screening stage
because otherwise researchers would have to infringe patents on compounds
before getting to the research stage at which the safe harbor applied. See
Transcript of Oral Argument at *26-28, Integra II, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No.
03-1237), 2005 WL 1106575. This is a compelling argument given the
necessary steps in drug research, but there was no indication at argument
that the Justices agreed.
196. No. 95 Civ. 8833(RPP), 2001 WL 1512597 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001).
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positive control against which to measure the activity of other
compounds (as in Integra197). Such uses of patented drugs or
lead compounds are likely to be within the safe harbor.
Because these compounds are chosen for their known
properties, the first prong of the Court’s test is satisfied, and
the second prong is probably satisfied because such uses of a
competitor’s patented compounds are the first step in
developing a competing drug candidate to take through FDA
approval.
Note finally that the Court’s test is drug-specific in that it
is stated in terms of “compounds.” To determine whether uses
of medical devices fall within the safe harbor, medical device
testing will likely continue to be governed by the standard set
forth in Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.198 The Intermedics
test is better suited to the medical device context (in which the
test itself arose), and in Integra the Court ostensibly endorsed
the Intermedics standard.199 Hence Integra seems unlikely to
disturb the cases decided under the Intermedics standard,
particularly the cases involving medical device testing. The
Integra test is formulated for drug research and will likely
replace the Intermedics test in cases involving drug patents.
In summary, some drug research and development
activities are clearly within the safe harbor; others certainly
fall outside it. At the edges of the safe harbor lie the activities
clustered around the phase when active compounds are first
identified. These activities fall into a gray area–the activities
may or may not be protected. Whether they are protected
depends on how strictly courts choose to apply the Supreme
Court’s Integra test. Note that the Integra Court remanded the
case to the Federal Circuit, which in turn reinstated the appeal
and ordered new briefs to be filed to account for the Supreme
Court’s opinion.200 The Federal Circuit’s eventual decision will
be an important precedent and a bellwether on application of
Integra’s two-pronged test.

197. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2379.
198. 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff’d, 991 F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
199. Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2384.
200. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 421 F.3d 1289, 1289
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
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2. Types of Patented Inventions That May Be Used Within the
Safe Harbor
One issue the Integra Court did not resolve satisfactorily is
whether certain inventions are outside the scope of the safe
harbor. The safe harbor provision protects the use of “patented
inventions.”201 The Supreme Court has held that this includes
“all inventions, not drug-related inventions alone.”202 Thus,
neither the statutory text nor the Court’s precedent limits the
safe harbor to drugs or other FDA-regulated products. A literal
reading of the text suggests that anything goes.
Nevertheless, drug researchers should not assume that
anything goes, for while the plain language of the safe harbor
may permit the use of any patented invention, all other indicia
of statutory meaning point toward a more limited exemption.
The statutory structure suggests that the safe harbor’s purpose
is to prevent the distortion in commercial marketing exclusivity
associated with the patents of FDA-regulated products.203
Similarly, the legislative history indicates that the safe harbor
protects only limited use of the patented inventions it covers.204
Nothing in the legislative history suggests an intent to create a
blanket license to ignore patent rights in product research and
development. The committee reports state plainly that the safe
harbor was not intended to significantly diminish the rights of
patent holders.205
Another important consideration is the takings clause of
the United States Constitution, which provides that private
property may not “be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”206 Application of current takings jurisprudence
to patent rights involves many legal subtleties beyond the scope
of this article.207 The basic concept is that patent rights are
201. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
202. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665 (1990).
203. See id. at 669-74.
204. See supra Part II.C.
205. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 30 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2714 (analogizing the safe harbor provision to the fair use
doctrine in copyright law); id. at 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2692
(stating that the safe harbor would not interfere with the patent holder’s
rights in the major commercial marketplace).
206. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
207. For an excellent discussion of this topic, see Zoltek Corp. v. United
States, 58 Fed. Cl. 688 (2003); see also J. Nicholas Bunch, Takings, Judicial
Takings, and Patent Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1747 (2005) and Shubha Ghosh,
Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual Property: The Path
Left Open After College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 637
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property rights which the federal government may not
appropriate without compensation.208 The Supreme Court has
held that regulation affecting the value of trade secrets, which
are intangible property rights analogous to patent rights, may
constitute a taking under the regulatory takings doctrine.209
Regulatory takings occur per se when government action either
subjects a property owner to a permanent physical invasion of
his or her property or deprives property of all economic value.
Otherwise, regulatory takings may occur according to several
factors prominently including interference with distinct
investment-based expectations.210 Hence, applications of the
safe harbor that vitiate or significantly diminish the value of
the patented inventions used may constitute regulatory
takings.
Congress considered exactly this question and
concluded that the safe harbor did not amount to a regulatory
taking, in part because the patent owner retained the right to
exclude others from the commercial marketplace.211 In this
view, application of the safe harbor is inappropriate where use
of a patented invention significantly reduces the commercial
value of the invention.
Modern drug research has been catalyzed by technological
progress. The rise of biotechnology in particular has facilitated
new drug discovery by providing products that can be used
either as tools in research or for therapeutic or diagnostic
purposes. Because the plain language of the safe harbor
ostensibly permits the use of patented research tools,
manufacturers of such tools, including many biotech firms,
understandably fear that drug companies are free to infringe
research tool patents with impunity in drug research. This fear
prompted several research tool manufacturers to file an amicus
brief in Integra asking the Supreme Court to state
unequivocally that research tool patents in fact are not

(2000).
208. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S.
722, 730 (2002) (holding that a patent confers a limited monopoly that is a
property right); James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1881) (holding that
patents may not be appropriated by the federal government without just
compensation).
209. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001-05 (1984).
210. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2081-82 (2005).
211. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 61 n.19 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2648, 2721.
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included in the safe harbor.212
The brief argued that
permitting pharmaceutical firms to infringe research tool
patents would significantly diminish the commercial value of
such patents because the tools derive significant value from use
in drug research.213 The Court expressly declined to consider
whether the safe harbor applied to research tools, stating that
the record indicated that the RGD peptides at issue in the case
were not used as research tools.214
In doing so, the Court suggested a distinction between a
This
research tool and the subject of the research.215
distinction is problematic. Known drugs and compounds with
biological activity are frequently used in research to discover or
measure the activity of other compounds. The RGD peptides in
Integra and the paclitaxel intermediates in Bristol-Myers
Squibb were used for these purposes.216 In either case the
compounds or biotech products are the subject of research, but
since these themselves are vital inputs of the research from
which discoveries emerge, they are functionally as much
research tools as are microscopes, centrifuges, incubators, and
the like.217 But although known drugs and compounds with
biological activity are used as research tools in a sense, such
use is at the core of the safe harbor, at least to the extent it
protects new drug development activities as Integra affirmed.
By the same token, the fact that a patented invention is
not a research tool does not necessarily render the safe harbor
exemption appropriate.
Consider this hypothetical: a
telecommunications company develops new technology
expressly for drug companies to send voluminous research data
and information to the FDA. The technology is expensive, so to
save money many drug companies have their engineers
duplicate the technology instead of buying it from the
telecommunications company. Because use of this patented
invention involves submitting information to the FDA, it would
be allowed by the literal language of the safe harbor provision.
212. See Brief for Invitrogen Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Integra II, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL
682093.
213. See id.
214. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2382 n.7 (2005).
215. See id.
216. See id. at 2379; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhône-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833(RPP), 2001 WL 1512597, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001).
217. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J.,
dissenting).
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However, this would be one of the most strained applications of
the safe harbor imaginable, even though the technology is not
being used as a research tool.
Thus, while certain applications of the safe harbor may be
inappropriate, the distinction to make is not a facile one
between research tool patents and non-research tool patents.
Upon close examination, that distinction proves to be neither
clear nor useful. Rather, courts should consider a particular
application in light of the safe harbor’s core meaning suggested
by statutory structure, purpose, and legislative history. That
core meaning is an exemption for using patented drugs and
other FDA-regulated products in research to develop competing
products, as Integra suggested with its many references to
using “compounds” in experiments. Moreover, the safe harbor
was not intended to impinge more than minimally on the
commercial value of affected patents. Applications of the safe
harbor to inventions other than the type the FDA regulates, or
applications that significantly reduce the commercial value of
the patent affected, are more or less anomalous. While the
Integra Court declined to determine whether research tools are
included in the safe harbor, it recognized that a separate issue
was presented that future courts may need to consider. Those
future courts should take this as an invitation to screen out
applications of the safe harbor that are anomalous for the
reasons just given.
Courts should not feel bound by the literal statutory
language to permit applications of the safe harbor that are
unjust, absurd, or otherwise far removed from the core
statutory meaning. The statutory language need not be read to
permit the use of any patented invention; considering the
statutory structure, purpose, and legislative history, the term
“patented invention” could be limited to the type of inventions
subject to FDA approval. This would not necessarily contradict
Eli Lilly’s statement that the safe harbor applies to all
patented inventions. Taken in the context of that case, the
statement meant that the safe harbor applies to medical
devices, not just drugs.
Courts should avoid literal
interpretations of statutes that lead to absurd results when
alternative constructions are available consistent with
legislative purpose or the meaning of the statute taken as a
whole.218 Because certain applications of the safe harbor may
218. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982);
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deprive patented inventions of a significant part of their
commercial value, the safe harbor should not be construed to
permit such applications as it would raise issues under the
takings clause. Courts should construe statutes to avoid such
constitutional doubt.219 Alternatively, a court could avoid an
anomalous application citing the lack of a plain statement in
the statutory text that the safe harbor requires such an
Even assuming that the literal language
application.220
includes such applications, the Supreme Court has previously
recognized that something can be in the literal language of a
statute and yet not within its meaning.221
The main problem with these arguments is the rationale of
the several cases, up to and including Integra, that have
refused to limit the scope of the safe harbor because of its broad
statutory language. For example, the safe harbor has been
held to protect experimentation with medical devices not
eligible for patent term extension.222 Integra applied the safe
harbor to new drug development activities, although the safe
harbor was arguably only intended for generic drug
development.
However, these applications were not
particularly anomalous. In both cases the inventions used were
of the same general type to which the safe harbor undoubtedly
applies—FDA-regulated products—and the inventions were
used experimentally in research to develop competing products.
Even if such applications were not intended by Congress, they
may be regarded as reasonable incidents of the statutory
scheme. Courts may distinguish these applications from others
Heydenfeldt v. Daney Gold & Silver Mining Co., 93 U.S. 634, 638 (1876).
219. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (applying canon to avoid
constitutional doubt to find that statutes had not repealed habeas jurisdiction
for resident aliens despite contrary suggestion from literal reading of statutory
text). In Eli Lilly, the Court rejected a constitutional doubt argument in
applying the safe harbor to medical devices. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic,
Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 n.7 (1990). The Court did so, however, because while
the safe harbor may significantly affect the commercial value of some medical
devices, it probably similarly affects the value of some drugs, so the
alternative interpretations in the case did not differ with respect to
constitutional doubt. See id. Certain applications of the safe harbor may be
distinguished if the user of the invention would otherwise be an ordinary
buyer of the invention, in which case the safe harbor has a direct, as opposed
to incidental, effect on the commercial value of the invention.
220. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298-99 (applying plain statement rule in
finding that statutes had not repealed habeas jurisdiction for resident aliens).
221. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979)
(citing Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
222. See Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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that seem unjust or absurd, such as the telecommunications
technology hypothetical discussed above.
The potential for application of the safe harbor to patented
biotechnology research tools has led to calls to amend the safe
harbor provision to remove such products from its scope.223
However, some biotech products, such as the RGD peptides in
Integra, have drug-like activity and could be used as drugs or
as tools to develop other drugs. When such products are tested
with intent to seek FDA approval, application of the safe
harbor is not particularly unreasonable.
Indeed, the
proliferation of biotechnology patents in recent years has the
potential to stymie downstream research and seems to make
application of the safe harbor all the more appropriate.224
However, if a particular biotechnology product is commercially
available and can simply be bought for use in research,
application of the safe harbor is questionable, especially if the
product is not being used in the research for its drug-like
properties.
The most dubious applications of the safe harbor’s literal
language are unauthorized uses of patented inventions that the
researcher can simply buy. This is true for two reasons. First,
such inventions can be used in product research and
development even before the relevant patents expire, thereby
removing the justification behind the safe harbor. Second,
application of the safe harbor to such uses would directly
reduce the commercial value of such inventions, especially for
inventions used mainly or entirely in drug research. That
would possibly amount to an uncompensated regulatory taking
and would certainly be contrary to the legislative intent in
enacting the safe harbor. For these reasons, courts are unlikely
to countenance the use of patented inventions for which the
drug company would otherwise be an ordinary buyer. This may
have been the reason underlying one court’s holding that the
safe harbor did not permit use of a patented culture medium in
research, although the culture medium at issue was not sold by

223. See Xiao, supra note 18.
224. See Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of
the Human Genome, 310 SCIENCE 239 (2005) (noting that almost one-fifth of
human genes are claimed in patents); Mireles, supra note 17, at 172 (asserting
that patents on biotech products could hinder downstream research); Wendy
Thai, Toward Facilitating Access to Patented Research Tools, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI.
& TECH. 373 (2004) (evaluating proposals to address this problem).
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the patent holder.225
Because the Integra opinion refused to comment on
whether certain patents could not be infringed within the safe
harbor, courts may or may not address this issue. One case
decided in the wake of Integra involved patented methods for
evaluating the safety of vaccine administration schedules.226
The District Court of Maryland cited to Integra and held that
use of these methods in vaccine research to provide postmarketing information to the FDA was protected by the safe
harbor.227 The court had Integra’s holding correct in that the
safe harbor extended to post-marketing research required by
the FDA, but the court should have analyzed whether it was
appropriate to include such patents in the safe harbor’s scope.
This was not a case of a company duplicating an invention it
could otherwise simply buy. Still, if one company holds a
patent on a research method, use of that method by another
company seems to infringe directly on the patent’s main value,
that being the ability to exclude others from using the research
method.
Future cases will undoubtedly test courts’ willingness to
forestall questionable applications of the safe harbor, and if
courts are unwilling to do so, it may be appropriate for
Congress to act. In the mean time, the Court’s reliance on the
statutory text in Integra does not mean that the safe harbor
extends to the limits of its literal statutory language. To the
contrary, Integra expressly declined to comment on whether
certain inventions were outside the safe harbor’s scope, and
courts have many reasons to fill in this blank by answering
that the safe harbor does not provide carte blanche to ignore
patent rights in drug research. While courts have consistently
broadened the safe harbor, they have not exceeded the bounds
of reason, and neither should private parties. Rather, those
taking advantage of the safe harbor should heed Justice
Holmes’s warning that the law sometimes imposes vague but
real limits.
C. THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXEMPTION AFTER INTEGRA
One other facet of Integra should be considered briefly.
225. See Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967, 974
(W.D. Wis. 1999).
226. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 381 F. Supp. 2d
452, 453-54 (D. Md. 2005).
227. See id. at 455-56.
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The dissenting judge in the Federal Circuit’s Integra decision
argued that the portion of Merck’s sponsored research that was
not covered by the safe harbor was protected by the common
law experimental use exemption.228 The Supreme Court did
not address this issue,229 hence the opinion does not change the
legal landscape for the common law experimental use
exemption, which has been construed very narrowly by the
courts.230
But while courts are unwilling to expand the experimental
use exemption, the safe harbor post-Integra should inform the
debate about whether Congress should do so. Scholars have
argued in favor of a broader experimental use exemption that
would permit the use of patented inventions in research to
modify or improve upon the inventions.231 The safe harbor as
interpreted by Integra is, at least at its core, a special
experimental use exemption for using FDA-regulated products
in development of competing products. The consequences of
this special experimental use exemption for drug research and
development should be useful in policy analysis for creation of a
general experimental use exemption.
Because of the time and expense required to develop a new
drug, the need for strong patent rights as an incentive to invent
reaches its zenith in the pharmaceutical industry.232 If the
pharmaceutical industry can nevertheless thrive with a robust
experimental use exemption in drug development, the
argument for a general experimental use exemption is
compelling.
The value of a patent for a new drug is
significantly reduced by competition from other new drugs and
generic drugs, competition enhanced by the Hatch-Waxman
regime.233 However, the number of new drugs in Phase III
clinical trials has remained relatively constant over recent
228. See Integra I, 331 F.3d 860, 872-78 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
229. At oral argument when the Justices questioned the parties about the
relevance of the experimental use exemption to the case, the parties responded
that the exemption was not part of their respective arguments and should not
be considered by the Court. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *6, *28, *51,
Integra II, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 1106575.
230. See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
231. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
232. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89
VA. L. REV. 1575, 1615-17 (2003).
233. See Dickson & Gagnon, supra note 44, at 421-22.
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years, while the number of new drugs in earlier phases of
testing has actually been increasing over the same period.234
This robust new drug development activity suggests that the
safe harbor has not diminished the industry’s drive to discover
new drugs. On the other hand, it is possible that the ability to
experiment with a competitor’s compounds contributes to the
phenomenon of so-called “me-too” drugs that closely imitate
existing pioneer drugs, although these incrementally
innovative drugs may still have some positive value.235 The full
effects of the safe harbor on drug research and development
deserve further study and analysis to determine more
definitively if experimental use is a net positive or a net
negative. Such studies should help inform policymakers on the
desirability of a general experimental use exemption.
CONCLUSION
The proper scope of the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor
provision has been unclear because the broad terms in the
statutory language may not fit with the arguably narrower
purpose evident from legislative history and statutory
structure. The Supreme Court in Integra set the course for
future courts by construing the safe harbor to provide for broad
experimental use of drugs and potential drugs in product
development. While the safe harbor is wide, it is still limited
by its purpose and by the rights of patent holders. While the
Court only partially described the limits in Integra, those
taking advantage of the safe harbor should remember that the
law sometimes imposes limits that are vague but nevertheless
real, and crossed at peril.
The safe harbor provision is a seemingly simple provision
of law that poses interpretive challenges because of the
complexity of the subject matter governed. The freedom to use
patented inventions in otherwise infringing uses has important
ramifications for the various industries involved in drug
research, ensuring that the safe harbor will continue to
generate controversy and litigation. Careful attention should
234. See Fredric J. Cohen, Macro Trends in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 4
NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 153, 157 (2005).
235. See id. at 153 (arguing that these imitating drugs often have
attributes that distinguish them from the prototype drug such as improved
efficacy, selectivity, or reduced toxicity, and that the drugs play a role in
maintaining industry profits and research and development funds because of
their inherently lower cost of development and risk).
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be paid to how industry and the drug approval process
generally fare under Integra’s broad experimental use regime.
From a policy perspective it is desirable to promote the
discovery and approval of new drugs, but it is highly
undesirable to do so by significantly undermining existing
patent rights. The safe harbor implicates different policy
objectives that require delicate balancing and judgment by
Congress, the courts, and the drug industry, all of whom share
responsibility for implementing the law within reason.

